Maksimum Bask\u0131 Stratejisi Tam Anlam\u0131yla Neden Ba\u015far\u0131ya Ula\u015fmad\u0131:<\/p>\n
Donald Trump y\u00f6netiminin (2017-2021) \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe koydu\u011fu \u201cMaksimum Bask\u0131\u201d stratejisi, tek tarafl\u0131 ekonomik yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ve finansal izolasyon yoluyla Tahran\u2019\u0131 yeni bir n\u00fckleer anla\u015fmaya zorlamay\u0131 ve b\u00f6lgesel n\u00fcfuzunu k\u0131rmay\u0131 hedeflemi\u015ftir. Ancak bu strateji, hedef akt\u00f6r\u00fcn asimetrik diren\u00e7 kapasitesi ve k\u00fcresel ticaret hatlar\u0131n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 nedeniyle yap\u0131sal s\u0131n\u0131rlara \u00e7arpm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma, Maksimum Bask\u0131 stratejisinin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k dinamiklerini, uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler literat\u00fcr\u00fcndeki “S\u00fcvey\u015f Analojisi” (Suez Analogy) kavramsal \u00e7apas\u0131 \u00fczerinden incelemektedir.<\/p>\n
1956 S\u00fcvey\u015f Krizi\u2019nde \u0130ngiltere\u2019nin d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc rasyonalizasyon hatas\u0131 ile modern d\u00f6nemde Washington\u2019\u0131n finansal hegemonyaya dayal\u0131 zorlay\u0131c\u0131 diplomasisi aras\u0131ndaki yap\u0131sal paralellikler ele al\u0131n\u0131rken; \u0130srail\u2019in b\u00f6lge jeopoliti\u011findeki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn 1956\u2019daki “taktiksel uygulay\u0131c\u0131” konumundan modern d\u00f6nemin “doktriner mimar\u0131” konumuna evrilmesi b\u00fct\u00fcnsel bir perspektifle analiz edilmektedir.<\/p>\n
G\u0130R\u0130\u015e <\/strong><\/p>\n Uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler teorisinde, b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7lerin d\u0131\u015f politika yap\u0131m s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde ve kriz anlar\u0131nda ge\u00e7mi\u015f tarihsel olaylar\u0131 birer alg\u0131sal s\u00fczge\u00e7 olarak kullanmas\u0131 “tarihsel analojiler” kavram\u0131yla a\u00e7\u0131klan\u0131r (Jervis, 1976). Karar al\u0131c\u0131lar, kar\u015f\u0131lar\u0131ndaki asimetrik tehditleri rasyonalize ederken \u00e7o\u011funlukla ge\u00e7mi\u015fteki ba\u015far\u0131 veya ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k modellerini birer \u015fablon olarak kabul ederler.<\/p>\n Donald Trump y\u00f6netiminin 2018 y\u0131l\u0131nda Ortak Kapsaml\u0131 Eylem Plan\u0131\u2019ndan (JCPOA) tek tarafl\u0131 olarak \u00e7ekilerek ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 “Maksimum Bask\u0131” stratejisi, ekonomik g\u00fcc\u00fcn tek ba\u015f\u0131na siyasi netice do\u011furabilece\u011fine olan sars\u0131lmaz bir inanca dayan\u0131yordu. Ancak stratejinin arzu edilen d\u00fczeyde ba\u015far\u0131ya ula\u015famamas\u0131, rasyonalite modellemelerinde k\u00fcresel deniz ticareti koridorlar\u0131n\u0131n k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ve hedef akt\u00f6r\u00fcn asimetrik yan\u0131t kapasitesinin do\u011fru hesaplanamad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. Bu stratejik k\u00f6r noktay\u0131 ve yap\u0131sal s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 anlamak ad\u0131na ba\u015fvurulacak en i\u015flevsel tarihsel \u00e7apa (conceptual anchor), 1956 S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131 Krizi\u2019dir.<\/p>\n 1956 y\u0131l\u0131nda M\u0131s\u0131r lideri Cemal Abd\u00fcnnas\u0131r\u2019\u0131n S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131\u2019n\u0131 millile\u015ftirme hamlesi, d\u00f6nemin gerileyen s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci g\u00fcc\u00fc \u0130ngiltere i\u00e7in s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci imparatorluk prestijine ve Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki hegemonik varl\u0131\u011f\u0131na vurulmu\u015f varolu\u015fsal bir darbe olarak alg\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Finer, 1964). D\u00f6nemin \u0130ngiltere Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Anthony Eden, bu krizi rasyonalize ederken iki \u00f6l\u00fcmc\u00fcl hata yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r:<\/p>\n \u00a0Asimetrik Direnci Hafife Alma:<\/strong> Londra, Nas\u0131r\u2019\u0131 “Nil\u2019in Mussolini\u2019si” olarak kodlayarak rasyonel olmayan bir indirgemecili\u011fe d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. \u0130ngiliz elitleri, konvansiyonel askeri \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn, anti-kolonyal Arap milliyet\u00e7ili\u011finin toplumsal me\u015fruiyetini arkas\u0131na alan bir rejimi tek hamlede y\u0131kabilece\u011fini varsaym\u0131\u015ft\u0131r .<\/p>\n \u00a0Sistemik D\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fc Okuyamama:<\/strong> \u0130ngiltere, II. D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131nda k\u00fcresel sistemin merkezka\u00e7 kuvvetinin el de\u011fi\u015ftirdi\u011fini; art\u0131k Washington ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n r\u0131zas\u0131 olmadan Ortado\u011fu\u2019da kal\u0131c\u0131 bir askeri-politik stat\u00fcko kurulamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 idrak edememi\u015ftir. \u0130ngiliz,<\/p>\n Frans\u0131z ve \u0130srail ittifak\u0131 askeri olarak Sina\u2019y\u0131 i\u015fgal edip kanala ula\u015fsa da, ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Eisenhower\u2019\u0131n \u0130ngiliz sterlinini deval\u00fce etme ve IMF kredilerini dondurma tehdidini i\u00e7eren finansal “maksimum bask\u0131s\u0131” kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda geri \u00e7ekilmek zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Kunz, 1991).<\/p>\n Stratejik \u00c7apa Ba\u011f\u0131: <\/strong>Bu tarihsel tecr\u00fcbe, Trump d\u00f6nemi ABD\u2019sinin \u0130ran stratejisi i\u00e7in yap\u0131sal bir ayna i\u015flevi g\u00f6r\u00fcr. \u0130ngiltere nas\u0131l askeri g\u00fcc\u00fcn otomatik olarak siyasi netice do\u011furaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 rasyonalize ettiyse; Trump y\u00f6netimi de ABD\u2019nin k\u00fcresel finansal hegemonya g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn (SWIFT sisteminden d\u0131\u015flama, ikincil yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar, petrol ambargosu) \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n b\u00f6lgesel a\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 ve vekil g\u00fc\u00e7ler (proxy) \u00fczerinden kurdu\u011fu asimetrik savunma doktrinini tek ba\u015f\u0131na \u00e7\u00f6kertece\u011fini varsaym\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Ancak 1956\u2019da \u0130ngiltere\u2019nin emperyal kibri k\u00fcresel ekonomik ger\u00e7ekliklere nas\u0131l \u00e7arpt\u0131ysa,<\/p>\n Trump\u2019\u0131n stratejisi de k\u00fcresel deniz ticareti, enerji koridorlar\u0131n\u0131n (S\u00fcvey\u015f, H\u00fcrm\u00fcz ve Bab\u00fclmendep bo\u011fazlar\u0131) hassasiyeti ve uluslararas\u0131 konsens\u00fcs\u00fcn eksikli\u011fi duvar\u0131na \u00e7arparak s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ran, yapt\u0131r\u0131mlara boyun e\u011fmek yerine, S\u00fcvey\u015f\u2019in g\u00fcney kap\u0131s\u0131 olan K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz ve Bab\u00fclmendep\u2019te asimetrik riskleri (Yemen’deki Husi kart\u0131 \u00fczerinden) t\u0131rmand\u0131rarak k\u00fcresel ekonomiyi rehine alm\u0131\u015f ve yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n bumerang etkisi yaratmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Cordesman, 2020). Washington, k\u00fcresel lojistik hatt\u0131n (S\u00fcvey\u015f\/K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz) tamamen fel\u00e7 olmas\u0131 riskini g\u00f6ze alamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, askeri t\u0131rmanma kapasitesini s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131rmak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n S\u00fcvey\u015f Analojisi i\u00e7inde \u0130srail, her iki kriz d\u00f6neminde de denklemin en dinamik akt\u00f6r\u00fcd\u00fcr. Ancak b\u00fct\u00fcnsel ve diyalektik bir okuma yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, \u0130srail\u2019in uluslararas\u0131 sistem ve b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7lerle olan ili\u015fkisindeki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn “taktiksel uygulay\u0131c\u0131l\u0131ktan” “strateji belirleyicili\u011fe” evrildi\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcr.<\/p>\n 1956\u2019da \u0130srail, gizli S\u00e8vres Protokol\u00fc \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde \u0130ngiltere ve Fransa ile askeri bir ittifaka girdi (Shlaim, 2001). \u0130srail\u2019in buradaki temel rasyoneli; Sina Yar\u0131madas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 silahs\u0131zland\u0131rmak ve Akabe K\u00f6rfezi\u2019ne (Tiran Bo\u011faz\u0131) deniz eri\u015fimini g\u00fcvence alt\u0131na almakt\u0131. \u0130srail ordusu (IDF), Kadesh Operasyonu ile askeri a\u00e7\u0131dan kusursuz bir ba\u015far\u0131 g\u00f6stererek Sina\u2019y\u0131 h\u0131zla ele ge\u00e7irdi. Ancak hamileri olan Londra ve Paris\u2019in Amerikan bask\u0131s\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda siyaseten \u00e7\u00f6kmesi, \u0130srail\u2019i de i\u015fgal etti\u011fi topraklardan kay\u0131ts\u0131z \u015farts\u0131z \u00e7ekilmeye zorlad\u0131. 1956 tecr\u00fcbesi \u0130srail stratejik akl\u0131na \u015fu paradigmay\u0131 kaz\u0131d\u0131: Ortado\u011fu\u2019da k\u00fcresel bir s\u00fcper g\u00fcc\u00fcn (ABD) mutlak siyasi ve diplomatik \u015femsiyesi olmadan tek ba\u015f\u0131na elde edilen askeri kazan\u0131mlar kal\u0131c\u0131 stat\u00fcko \u00fcretemez.<\/p>\n Modern Ortado\u011fu jeopoliti\u011finde \u0130srail\u2019in bu stratejideki konumu \u00fc\u00e7 ana s\u00fctuna dayanmaktad\u0131r: <\/strong><\/p>\n uygularken, \u0130srail karasal alanda (\u00f6zellikle Suriye ve Irak hatt\u0131nda) \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n lojistik ge\u00e7i\u015f koridorlar\u0131n\u0131 (\u015eii Koridoru) s\u00fcrekli olarak askeri istihbarat, siber operasyonlar ve nokta hava imha stratejileriyle vurarak yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n askeri baca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tek ba\u015f\u0131na s\u0131rtlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong>S\u00fcvey\u015f Analojisi\u2019nin sundu\u011fu b\u00fct\u00fcnsellik, b\u00f6lgesel stat\u00fcn\u00fcn d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda b\u0131rak\u0131lan en b\u00fcy\u00fck devlet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 akt\u00f6r olarak K\u00fcrtlerin jeopolitik konumlan\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 ve k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 anlamak a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan da berrak bir vizyon sunar.<\/p>\n 1956\u2019da b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7lerin (\u0130ngiltere ve Fransa) S\u00fcvey\u015f bozgunuyla Ortado\u011fu sahnesinden radikal bi\u00e7imde tasfiye edilmesi, b\u00f6lgede radikal ve revizyonist Arap milliyet\u00e7ili\u011finin (Nas\u0131rizm ve Baas\u00e7\u0131l\u0131k) y\u00fckseli\u015f dalgas\u0131n\u0131 tetiklemi\u015ftir. Bu dalga ise, Irak ve Suriye\u2019deki K\u00fcrt varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ve ulusal hak taleplerinin on y\u0131llar boyunca sistematik olarak militarist devlet ayg\u0131tlar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan bask\u0131lanmas\u0131, asimilasyonu ve marjinalle\u015ftirilmesiyle sonu\u00e7lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (McDowall, 2004).<\/p>\n Modern Maksimum Bask\u0131 d\u00f6neminde ise, Trump y\u00f6netiminin m\u00fcttefikleri d\u0131\u015flayan, tek tarafl\u0131 ve yaln\u0131zca ekonomik odakl\u0131 rasyonalite hatas\u0131, b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fcvenlik mimarisinde ciddi g\u00fc\u00e7 bo\u015fluklar\u0131 yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 konsens\u00fcs\u00fc sa\u011flayamamas\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6kertmedi\u011fi gibi, aksine Tahran\u2019\u0131n bat\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na (Irak K\u00fcrdistan B\u00f6lgesi ve Suriye’nin kuzeydo\u011fusu-Rojava hatt\u0131na) asimetrik askeri tahkimat yapma h\u0131rs\u0131n\u0131 ve h\u0131r\u00e7\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kam\u00e7\u0131lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Washington\u2019\u0131n deniz rotalar\u0131ndaki k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131\u011f\u0131 (Husiler \u00fczerinden K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz lojisti\u011finin tehdit edilmesi) ve stratejik oda\u011f\u0131n\u0131n k\u00fcresel deniz ticaret hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fine kaymas\u0131, karasal alanda K\u00fcrt akt\u00f6rleri \u0130ran Devrim Muhaf\u0131zlar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n (IRGC) do\u011frudan f\u00fczeli sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131, suikastlar\u0131 ve \u015eii vekil g\u00fc\u00e7lerin (Ha\u015fdi \u015eabi vb.) co\u011frafi ku\u015fatmas\u0131yla ba\u015f ba\u015fa b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n T\u0131pk\u0131 1956\u2019da \u0130ngiltere\u2019nin rasyonalizasyon hatas\u0131n\u0131n faturas\u0131n\u0131 b\u00f6lgedeki stat\u00fcko d\u0131\u015f\u0131 unsurlar\u0131n \u00f6demesi gibi, modern maksimum bask\u0131 stratejisinin de kendi yap\u0131sal s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na \u00e7arparak b\u00f6lgeyi daha fazla g\u00fcvenlikle\u015ftirme\u00a0 sarmal\u0131na sokmas\u0131, K\u00fcrt siyasal hareketlerini b\u00f6lgesel vizyonda daha kaygan, k\u0131r\u0131lgan ve riskli bir jeopolitik zemine itmi\u015ftir. Trump d\u00f6neminin Maksimum Bask\u0131 stratejisi, k\u00fcresel ticaretin \u015fah damar\u0131 olan S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131 ve K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz jeopoliti\u011fini, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n asimetrik diren\u00e7 kapasitesini ve m\u00fcttefiklerin lojistik ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 do\u011fru hesaplayamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in “ekonomik a\u00e7\u0131dan y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131, fakat jeopolitik a\u00e7\u0131dan yetersiz” bir strateji olarak uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler tarihindeki yerini alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n S\u00fcvey\u015f Krizi’nde (1956) \u0130ngiltere ve Fransa t\u00fcm hedeflerine ula\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131 i\u00e7in mi geri \u00e7ekildiler? Hay\u0131r. ABD ve Sovyet bask\u0131s\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda “g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131” g\u00f6rd\u00fckleri i\u00e7in geri ad\u0131m att\u0131lar.<\/p>\n Bug\u00fcn de ABD ve \u0130ran, kendi g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131na dayand\u0131klar\u0131 i\u00e7in bu masadalar. Bu y\u00fczden, sars\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 da olsa, krizlerle dolu da ge\u00e7se, b\u00f6lgesel bir sava\u015f\u0131 \u00f6nleyecek pragmatik ve ge\u00e7ici bir mutabakat metninin \u00e7\u0131kaca\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131yorum. Ancak bu bir “bahar havas\u0131” de\u011fil, silahlar\u0131n g\u00f6lgesinde bir “so\u011fuk bar\u0131\u015f” olacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n \n Kaynak\u00e7a <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0Cordesman, A. H. (2020). The Iran-UAE-US Triangle: Maximum Pressure and Its Limits. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).<\/p>\n \u00a0Finer, H. (1964). Dulles Over Suez: The Suez Crisis of 1956. Heinemann.<\/p>\n \u00a0Indyk, M. (2021). The Abraham Accords and the Reshaping of the Middle East. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.<\/p>\n \u00a0Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press.<\/p>\n \u00a0Kunz, D. B. (1991). The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. University of North Carolina Press.<\/p>\n \u00a0McDowall, D. (2004). A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris.<\/p>\n \u00a0Nasr, V. (2019). “The Middle East’s Next War: Iran, Israel, and the Limits of Maximum Pressure”. Foreign Affairs, 98(1), 22-34.<\/p>\n \u00a0Shlaim, A. (2001). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. W. W. Norton & Company.<\/p>\n \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00d6zet Maksimum Bask\u0131 Stratejisi Tam Anlam\u0131yla Neden Ba\u015far\u0131ya Ula\u015fmad\u0131: Donald Trump y\u00f6netiminin (2017-2021) \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe koydu\u011fu \u201cMaksimum Bask\u0131\u201d stratejisi, tek tarafl\u0131 ekonomik yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ve finansal izolasyon yoluyla Tahran\u2019\u0131 yeni bir n\u00fckleer anla\u015fmaya zorlamay\u0131 ve b\u00f6lgesel n\u00fcfuzunu k\u0131rmay\u0131 hedeflemi\u015ftir. Ancak bu strateji, hedef akt\u00f6r\u00fcn asimetrik diren\u00e7 kapasitesi ve k\u00fcresel ticaret hatlar\u0131n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 nedeniyle yap\u0131sal s\u0131n\u0131rlara […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1038519,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[31],"class_list":["post-1038518","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-forum","tag-onemli"],"blocksy_meta":[],"seo_head":"\n\u00a0Zorlay\u0131c\u0131 Diplomasi ve Alg\u0131sal Hatalar<\/h1>\n
1.1956 S\u00fcvey\u015f\u2019ten Modern D\u00f6neme: \u0130ngiltere\u2019nin Rasyonalizasyon Hatas\u0131 ve G\u00fc\u00e7 \u0130ll\u00fczyonu<\/h3>\n
2.\u00a0 B\u00fct\u00fcnsellik i\u00e7inde \u0130srailin Konumu:Ta\u015faronluktan stratejik mimarl\u0131\u011fa<\/h3>\n
A. 1956 S\u00fcvey\u015f Krizi\u2019nde \u0130srail<\/h3>\n
B. Maksimum Bask\u0131 D\u00f6nemi\u2019nde \u0130srail<\/h3>\n
\n
\n
\n
3.\u00a0 K\u00fcrt Meselesine Jeopolitik Yans\u0131malar\u0131 ve B\u00fct\u00fcnsel Sonu\u00e7<\/h3>\n
Sonu\u00e7 Olarak<\/h1>\n